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Abstract
This paper takes the theoretical model Professor Catherine Rogers developed in her article “Fit 
and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for International Arbitration,” 23 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 341 (2002) as the starting point for an original argument that conflicts of laws 
analysis should be used to determine which legal ethics rules should apply to lawyers practicing 
international arbitration.  The argument is supported by the new ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct rule on choice of law explicitly applies conflicts of laws analysis to 
lawyers practicing in the multijurisdictional settings.  This paper analyses the new ABA Model 
Rule and its impact on lawyers practicing in international arbitration.
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Peace is Not the Absence of Conflict:*
A Response to Professor Rogers’ Article “Fit and Function in Legal Ethics”
Introduction
International arbitration has become the preeminent way in which transnational business 
disputes are adjudicated.1  As the field of arbitration expands and diversifies,2 the question as to 
how the lawyers who represent parties to these disputes can and should best be regulated has 
come to the forefront.  
Suppose a German and an American lawyer represent opposing sides in an arbitration:  
The German professional ethics rule prohibits the lawyer from speaking with witnesses before 
the hearing, because such communications would constitute “witness tampering.”3  The 
American rule not only permits pre-testimonial communications, but arguably requires that the 
lawyer engage in such “witness preparation.”4  Which ethical rules should apply to these 
lawyers?
Professor Catherine A. Rogers sets out to answer this question in her article “Fit and 
Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for International Arbitration.”5  Rogers 
proposes a novel methodology, which she calls the “functional approach,” that is designed to 
develop the substantive content of the rules of professional conduct to govern in the context of 
international arbitration.  In a companion article, Rogers’ proposes that these rules should be 
*
“Peace is not the absence of conflict but the presence of creative alternatives for responding to conflict.” Dorothy Thompson.
1Hans Smit, The Future of International Commercial Arbitration: A Single Transnational Institution?, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
9, 12 (1987); Carrie Menkel-Meadows, Ethics Issues in Arbitration and Related Dispute Resolution Processes: What’s Happening and What’s 
Not, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 949, 949 (2002). See also, Susan L. Karamanian, Overstating the "Americanization" of International Arbitration: 
Lessons from ICSID, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 5, 33 (2003);  Detlev Vagts, The International Legal Profession: A Need For More 
Governance?, 90 A.J.I.L. 250, 261 (1996).
2Mary C. Daly, Resolving Ethical Conflicts in Multijurisdictional Practice – Is Model Rule 8.5 the Answer, an Answer, or No Answer 
at All?, 26 S. TEX. L. REV. 715 (1995) (noting the expansion of multijurisdictional practice); Richard Abel, The Future of the Legal Profession: 
Transnational Law Practice, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 737 (1994) (describing trends in globalization of legal practice).
3Catherine A. Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for International Arbitration, 23 MICH. J. 
INT’L L.341, 359, n.84 (2002) (using the terms “witness tampering” and “witness preparation”).  This example is also discussed in Detlev Vagts, 
Professional Responsibility in Transborder Practice: Conflict and Resolution, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 677, 688 (2000).
4Rogers, supra note 3, at 359.
5Rogers, supra note 3.
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promulgated and enforced by the arbitral tribunals themselves.6
This paper evaluates the “functional approach” and concludes that it is not necessary to 
derive a wholly new set of rules of professional conduct for lawyers practicing international 
arbitration.  This paper argues, instead, that currently extant professional rules and disciplinary 
institutions are sufficient to regulate attorneys practicing in international arbitration and that a 
conflicts of laws approach is the best approach to lawyer regulation in that context. 
 In Part I, I outline Rogers’ functional approach and describe the way in which it derives 
the content of the ethical rules governing lawyers from the “functional role” in a particular 
context.  In laying the foundation for her novel theory, Rogers rejects several alternative methods 
for ascertaining ethical rules for lawyers in international arbitration, including the conflicts of 
laws approach.  I review Rogers’ critique of the choice of law approach at the end of Part I.  In 
Part II, I argue that the conflicts of law approach is not only a feasible solution, but, in fact, 
provides the best answer to the question of which rules should govern lawyers practicing in 
international arbitration.  First, I provide an alternative description of the differences between 
national legal ethics regimes, which does not require the conclusion that lawyers play 
fundamentally different roles in these regimes.  Then I argue that national ethical regulation 
already provides for application of conflicts of laws principles in the context of international 
arbitration.  Finally, I analyze the conceptual reasons, including independence of the legal 
profession and co-equal sovereignty of nations under international law, that support the 
application of conflict of laws doctrine.  In Part III, I apply a conflicts of laws approach to a few 
of Rogers’ examples as well as those of other scholars who have addressed these issues in order 
6Catherine A. Rogers, Context and Institutional Structure in Attorney Regulation: Constructing an Enforcement Regime for 
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to demonstrate the practicability of the approach.
I. Rogers Claims the Functional Approach Provides the Only Viable Methodology for 
Developing the Content of Ethical Rules in International Arbitration.
Rogers provides two different formulations of the problem of lawyer regulation in 
international regulation:  Either international arbitration is an “ethical no man’s land” where 
lawyers are not subject to any regulation at all, or lawyers practicing in international arbitration 
are subject to multiple regulatory regimes so that it is unclear which ethical rules they should 
follow.7  Furthermore, even if there is not an obvious conflict, such as the witness 
preparation/tampering example, there is always an implicit conflict among lawyers from 
different jurisdictions simply because they have different “professional habits” that structure the 
ways in which they practice.8  Compliance with ethical rules can have significant effects on the 
substantive outcome of the arbitration—if the American lawyer prepares her witnesses, but the 
German lawyer does not, the American client may well fare better.  In order for a proceeding to 
be fair, all attorneys involved must be “playing by the same rules.”9  Under Rogers’ theory, 
either formulation of the problem requires the same solution, namely, a self-sufficient code of 
ethics for lawyers engaged in international arbitration.
International Arbitration, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2003).
7Rogers, supra note 3, at 343;  Rogers, supra note 7, at 2-3 (“[A]ttorneys in an international arbitration are either each abiding by 
different and often conflicting national ethical rules, or are engaging in a completely unregulated ethical free-for-all.”) 
8Id. at 357. See also Sheila Block, Ethics in International Proceedings, INT’L LITIG. NEWS, (Int’l Bar Ass’n), Oct. 2004, at 15, 18 
(noting that “it may be hard for lawyers in some jurisdictions to get used to” regulations that differ from the rules to which they are accustomed, 
clear regulations are preferable.)
9Rogers, supra note 3, at 346. Cf. Daly, supra note 3, at 757.
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A. The “Functional Approach” Derives Legal Ethics from the Lawyer’s Role.
 Rogers’ theory describes ethics as inextricably dependent on the lawyer’s role.10  Rogers 
insists that this is a “conceptual analysis” of ethical rules and not an account of their historical 
origins.11  The first part of the functional approach describes the “universal” structure of the 
lawyer’s role.  The second situates that role in the context of the procedural and the ethical rules 
of a justice system.
1. The Ethical Obligations of a Lawyer Are Derived from Her Role, Which 
Is Determined by the Procedural Framework of Her Legal System.
Rogers argues that the ethical obligations of any particular person under a particular 
circumstance are inherently bound up with her “role” and can only be determined in the context 
of that role.12  She illustrates with the example of the obligation to take care of a child—the 
child’s mother has an ethical obligation to feed the child, whereas an unrelated person in a far 
away place may not.13  However, while a role guides conduct, it does not fully determine the 
corresponding ethical obligations.  To extend the example, while the mother’s role creates an 
affirmative duty to feed the child, that role does not specify when, what or how she should feed 
it.  Since the lawyer’s role is more complex and nuanced than can be fully captured within any 
set of ethical rules, no matter how comprehensive, professional codes of conduct are best viewed 
as “mak[ing] certain choices impermissible and fram[ing] the inquiry for other choices.”14
Legal ethics is complex because the lawyer’s role “rests on an inherent contradiction,” in 
10Rogers, supra note 3, at 387 (“The thesis of the functional approach is that ethical regimes are tied to the inter-relational roles 
performed by actors ... in different systems”).
11Id. at 380 n.188.
12Id. at 382.
13Id.
14Id.
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that it encompasses obligations both to the public as well as to the client.15  Legal ethics is 
situated on the continuum between law and ethics, professional and moral responsibility.  Given 
the premise that ethics are inextricably connected to role, Rogers identifies several “universal 
features” and “core principles” that, in varying proportions, define the contours of the lawyer’s 
role in any judicial system.16  These values include: truthfulness, fairness, independence, loyalty 
and confidentiality.17  The essence of any advocate’s role is the particular balance it strikes 
between the advocate’s obligations to the client (as manifested in loyalty and confidentiality) and 
her obligations to the public, the profession, and the courts (truthfulness and fairness).  The 
lawyer’s role in any given society rests somewhere along the continuum between “officer of the 
court” and “zealous advocate.”18
The second part of the functional approach situates this “generic” role structure the 
context of the cultural values of the society, and the procedural, evidentiary and ethical rules of 
that society’s justice system.19  Rogers argues that a code of legal ethics represents the final 
culmination of a developmental progression that begins with the cultural values of a society.   
The cultural values of a society give rise to the procedural and evidentiary rules of the justice  
system.20  The procedural and evidence rules in turn determine the lawyer’s role by “dictat[ing] 
the specific activities through which the lawyer will perform [their advocacy obligations].”21
Finally, that role is expressed in the ethical code.  Rogers strongly emphasizes that the lawyer’s 
role in the justice system precedes the ethical code even as it may be “defin[ed]’ by that code.”22
15Id. at 383.  See also Vagts, supra note 3, at 686 (“The tension between keeping clients' confidences and assuring honesty and legality 
is resolved in different ways if one sees lawyers as court officers or as client caretakers.”)
16Rogers, supra note 3, at 384.
17Id. at 358–71.
18Cf. Vagts supra note 3, at 686 (discussing the differences between cultures that emphasize the lawyer’s function as an “officer of the 
court” function as opposed to those which emphasize the lawyer’s obligation to the client).
19Rogers, supra note 3, at 385.
20Id.
21Id.
22Id. at 383.
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In comparing legal ethics across national boundaries, then, Rogers suggests that we should think 
about “national ethical regimes ... as reflecting procedurally-determined and culturally-bound 
differences” in the lawyer’s roles in those various countries.
2. The Relationship Between “Role” and “Rules” Described by the 
Functional Approach Explains the Differences Between Civil and 
Common Law Systems.
Rogers moves on to “prove” her theory by using it to describe differences between the 
US and German legal systems.23  She characterizes the US judicial system as founded on values 
of “individualism” and “due process.”24  These values lead to a framework of procedural and 
evidentiary rules that allow each party to present his case to a neutral judge whose decisions 
ultimately make law.25  In this context, the lawyer is a “strategist,” who presents the facts of the 
case and the supporting precedent in the light  most favorable to her client, and a “lobbyist,” who 
persuades the judge of the way the law should be.  The lawyer’s role is weighted to the zealous 
advocacy side of the continuum.  This role determines that the ethical rules will encourage 
conduct that will further client-based strategy and advocacy, including, for example, witness 
preparation. 
The German culture, on the other hand, is characterized by a “greater acceptance of 
authority and less tolerance for certainty.”26  Those values lead to a set of procedural and 
evidentiary rules that places the judge at the helm where he actively runs the fact-finding 
process, including interrogating the parties’ witnesses, and then applies the civil code to these 
facts.  In this system, the lawyer is not a strategist, and certainly not a lobbyist, but rather a 
23Id. at 387.  See also, Vagts, supra note 3, at 687 (noting that “[w]hile comparisons between Anglo-American and Continental legal 
systems as being adversarial as opposed to inquisitorial are regarded as oversimplified by the experts, they sill provide a useful contrast for 
comparative purposes.”).
24Id. at 394.
25Rogers, supra note 3, at 390 (describing the US system as “a model of party contest before a ‘judicial tabula rasa’”).
26Id.
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“guide” to the court, a collaborator with the judge in a mutual quest for resolution of the issue.27
This role requires an ethical rule that prohibits lawyers from tampering with witnesses, because 
such conduct would undermine the judge’s access to unadulterated evidence. 
3. The Functional Approach Can Prescribe the Content of the Rules for 
International Arbitration.
The purpose of the functional approach is, of course, to formulate a set of professional 
ethics rules to govern lawyers practicing in international arbitration, thus filling the void of 
regulation Rogers identifies in this area.  
In order to derive the content of the ethical rules from the role of the lawyer in the 
international arbitration system, Rogers looks first to the underlying “cultural values” of 
international arbitration.  While she concedes that international arbitration is “a system of dispute 
resolution without geographic borders or a discernible citizenry” such that it doesn’t have 
“cultural values” per se, she nevertheless maintains that international arbitration has “distinctive 
normative goals” that provide the basis for the procedural and, ultimately, ethical rules of that 
system.28  These normative goals include: neutrality, effective resolution of disputes, and party 
autonomy.29  Because international arbitration has these qualities, businesses often select it as the 
mandatory form of dispute resolution in their initial contracts.  Arbitration provides a more 
neutral venue than the national court of any of the parties.30  Arbitral awards are not appealable 
enforceable in nearly any jurisdiction, under international treaties, such as the New York 
Convention.31  Arbitrators typically have particularized knowledge of the industry or terms of the 
dispute so that they have a unique ability to adjudicate the fine subtleties of the dispute in the 
27Id. at 389.
28Id. at 408.
29Id. at 408–411.
30Smit, supra note 1, at 11.
31Id. at 10.
Submission:  July 20, 2006 Page 8 of 42
Kirsten Weisenberger
most equitable manner (and not necessarily one dictated by precedent).32  As a private regime, 
the parties control which issues are addressed as well as the procedures followed by the 
tribunal.33
Although parties are entitled to determine the procedures used in their arbitral 
proceedings,34 default procedures have been adopted by the International Bar Association 
(“IBA”).35  Rogers makes much of these “hybridized” procedures and claims that they flow from 
the normative goals of the international arbitration system.  In my opinion, the more ready 
explanation is that the hybrid procedures represent a compromise between the civil and common 
law procedural frameworks to which the lawyers practicing in international arbitration are 
accustomed.36  That contention is addressed in detail in Part II, below.  According to Rogers, 
however, the fact that the hybrid procedures allow for a fair amount of US-style lawyer 
advocacy, including direct and cross-examination of witnesses, represents the expression of 
arbitration’s normative goal of party autonomy. 
The final step in the functional approach is, of course, to derive ethical rules from the 
lawyer’s role as it is shaped by procedure.  The hybrid arbitral procedures create a role for the 
lawyer in which “the attorney’s sphere or obligation to the client must be expanded over that of 
the classic civil law system, but not nearly to the dimensions of the US system.”37  Specifically, 
Rogers notes that the procedural rules allow for introduction of prepared witness statements and 
a certain amount of cross-examination.38  She infers that the ethical rules “must therefore 
32Rogers, supra note 3, at 408 n.319.
33Id. at 11, 12
34Smit, supra note 1, at 12 n. 11.
35Rogers, supra note 3, at 414.
36Id. at 416 n.362; see also, notes 83–92 and accompanying text, infra.
37Id. at 418.
38Id. See also, Rogers, supra note 6, at 27.
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accommodate some pre-testimonial communication with witnesses.”39  The functional approach 
requires that ethical rules agree with the procedural framework and that they account for and 
flow from the lawyer’s role in the particular justice system.
B. Conflicts of Law Doctrine Cannot Provide Ethics Rules for International 
Arbitration Because it Does Not Account for the Lawyer’s Unique Role in That 
Setting.
Rogers addresses several alternative ways of coming up with rules of professional 
responsibility for international arbitration and declares them all “implausible.”40  I will only 
address her brief critique of conflicts of laws here.  
The conflicts of law discussion is only relevant to international arbitration in the event 
that national ethics regimes apply in that context.  If it is truly the case that international 
arbitration is void of professional regulation, conflicts of laws doctrine will not get us anywhere.  
Rogers’ insists that national regulation does not apply, based on a prior formulation of ABA 
Model Rule 8.5 that “expressly disavow[ed] application in the international context.”41  As I will 
discuss below, the rule has been changed and now expressly does apply to international practice.  
This change nullifies Rogers’ initial argument that there is no conflict between national laws to 
resolve because they don’t apply in the first instance.
In the case national ethics rules do apply to lawyers engaged in an international 
arbitration, Rogers gives several reasons why conflicts of law does not provide a satisfactory 
solution.  Her primary critique is that international arbitration and the role of its lawyers have 
“unique features” and differ “at an organic level” from national courts and their lawyers.42  These 
differences render ethics rules devised to fit the function of lawyers in national courts 
39Rogers, supra note 3, at 418.
40Id. at 395.
41Id. at 356–357 nn. 71–73 & 403 n.296. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (1993).
42Id. at 402, n.304.
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inapplicable to international arbitration.  Essentially, she argues that the unique role of the 
international arbitration lawyer requires unique ethics rules.  To expose the “untenab[ility]” of 
conflicts of law in this arena, Rogers describes a situation in which the procedures chosen for the 
arbitration allowed for American-style discovery, but the ethics rule selected by choice of law 
did not privilege attorney-client communications.43  The untenable result is that attorney-client 
communications would be discoverable.  As I will illustrate in Part III of this paper, proper 
application of conflicts doctrine should not produce such results.  
Rogers further points out that national ethics rules do not provide guidance for all of the 
circumstances found in international arbitration, including selection of the arbitrator.  She claims 
the “time-cost” of filling these gaps on an ad hoc basis is “prohibitive.”44  Finally, she notes that 
conflicts of laws are “unsettled ... in many legal systems,” so that there is a danger that they 
would be hard to agree upon and their application would be “unpredictable” and “potentially  
detrimental.”45  This is not a criticism of the fundamentals of conflicts of law, but rather a 
suspicion that it will not be applied properly.  Rogers fundamental criticisms of conflicts of law 
rest firmly on the assumption that international arbitration is unique and so requires a “specially 
tailored” ethics code.  In the next Part of this paper, I will provide an alternate explanation of 
national ethical codes and the procedural framework of international arbitration that renders the 
application of conflicts of law to ethics rules in that context not only plausible but necessary.
III. Conflicts of Laws Doctrine Accounts for the Relevant Regulatory Interests Better Than 
Does Rogers’ Functional Approach.
Rogers’ theory, as described above, depends on the factual assessment that international 
43Id. at 402.
44Id. at 404.
45Id. at 405 n.305.
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arbitration takes place in “an a-national space.”46  She argues that nationally based professional 
regulation does not reach lawyers’ conduct in international arbitration.  I argue in this Part that 
both of this premises is false, as evidenced by the new version of the ABA Model Rule 8.5 and 
the European Community Professional Ethics Code (the CCBE), and as supported by the 
principles of the co-equal sovereignty of nations and the independence of the legal profession.  
Conflicts of laws provides a way to apply extant ethical regimes and disciplinary systems to 
international arbitration.  I will argue that this is a theoretically more sound solution than Rogers’ 
recommendation that institution-specific ethical rules be derived by way of the functional 
method.
I will begin by reformulating the problem as one of notice rather than conflicting rules.  
For example, take the pre-testimonial communications rules discussed above.  Instead of 
focusing on the difference between the rules the two sides are accustomed to following, I would 
like to note that the unfair result only occurs in the situation in which the American lawyer 
prepares her witnesses and the German lawyer does not.  If both sides knew about the 
discrepancy, this would never come to pass.  In that case, the German lawyer would protest 
against the inequity, and the American lawyer would insist on her right and duty to go forward 
with her preparation.  The parties and the tribunal would be forced to resolve the disagreement in 
some manner.  The problem is one of notice:  The American and German lawyer must know 
about and adhere to the same standard in order to ensure that the proceeding is equitable and fair.  
Furthermore, lawyers in international arbitration need to know which ethics rules will be applied 
to their conduct in the event of an eventual disciplinary action.47
46Id. at 356.
47Block, supra note 8 (emphasizing the practical problem lawyers face in deciding what ethical rules to follow in international 
proceedings).  As Professor Detlev Vagts notes, “questions of lawyer behavior in international situations may have to be determined in the 
context of professional disciplinary proceedings.” Vagts, supra note 3, at  688.
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Whereas Rogers states that “[a]ttorneys remain subject to often conflicting professional 
obligations,”48 I insist that attorneys are actually only subject to one set of professional 
obligations.  The problem is that it may not be clear to them which obligations they are subject 
to.  Rogers concludes that “[a] code is needed to get all the participants playing by the same 
rules.”49  To which I respond that a level playing field can also be achieved by notifying all 
counsel of the applicable ethical rules.  The playing field will just as level if the American lawyer 
is told that the German rule on pre-testimonial communications governs in a particular case.  
Rogers concedes this point with respect to cross-border practice when she states “[f]or regulation 
of cross-border practice, conflict-of-law rules may in fact be appropriate, as long as they are 
clear in their application.”50  But she does not explain why arbitration should be treated 
differently than other cross-border practice.  As long as we can provide practitioners with notice 
as to which ethics rules apply to them, the playing field will be leveled and the dilemmas faced 
by lawyers in international arbitration will be resolved.  Conflicts of laws doctrine provides the 
necessary notice.
A. The Differences Among National Ethics Rules Are Best Explained Historically.
I would replace Rogers’ “conceptual” analysis of legal ethics with a comparative, 
historical analysis.  Ethical rules best understood, not in terms of the concept of the lawyer’s 
role, but rather as a historical contingency that operates in tandem with the procedural and other 
features of a legal system to express the lawyer’s role within it.  The development of detailed 
ethics rules in the US took place over the course of nearly one hundred years, instigated and 
48Rogers, supra note 3, at 346.
49Id.
50Id. at 398 n.276.
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propelled by various forces that changed the way in which legal services were provided.51
Similarly, legal ethics in European countries and the EU have developed over the past few 
decades, including the notable promulgation of a code of conduct for European lawyers engaged 
in cross-border practice, the CCBE Code.52  Whereas Rogers suggests we should analyze 
international arbitration as if it were a society with a culture that promoted the values of its 
justice system by implementing certain procedures within its tribunals, I suggest that we view 
international arbitration as a commingling of the historically rooted legal systems of co-equal 
sovereigns.
In this subsection, I argue first that differences in national ethical rules do not necessarily 
reflect profound differences in the lawyer’s role.  Then I argue that the variation in national 
ethical codes can be largely credited to the different stages of historical development of the legal 
profession across jurisdictions.  Finally, I argue that the procedural rules of international 
arbitration reflect a compromise between these systems.  
1. The Cultural Divide Between Civil and Common Law Judicial Systems 
Does Not Necessarily Reflect a Profound Difference in the Understanding 
of the Lawyer’s Role.
The success of Rogers’ argument depends on the uniqueness of the lawyer’s role in a 
given legal system.  It is possible to maintain Rogers’ view that ethics rules are closely related to 
procedural rules without concluding that different procedural rules reflect fundamentally 
different conceptions of the lawyer’s role.  This is because the procedural framework 
underdetermines the lawyer’s role.  The hybrid procedures of international arbitration are 
51Laurel S. Terry, U.S. Legal Ethics: The Coming of Age of Global and Comparative Perspectives, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. 
REV. 463 (2005) (surveying the development of legal ethics from 1904 through the present).
52Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Community (CCBE) published the CCBE Code in 1988.  CCBE CODE OF 
CONDUCT (1988) [hereinafter “the CCBE Code”].  See, Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the European Community’s Legal Ethics Code Part I: 
An Analysis of the CCBE Code of Conduct, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (1993) [hereinafter “Terry Part I”]; Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the 
European Community’s Legal Ethics Code Part II: Applying the the CCBE Code of Conduct, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 345 (1993) [hereinafter 
“Terry Part II”].  See also John Toulmin Q.C., A Worldwide Common Code of Professional Ethics?, 15 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 673 (1992) 
(discussing the CCBE code in connection with the possibility for an international code of professional ethics). 
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insufficient to hypothesize a wholly unique role for the lawyer in that context.  
Even though the dichotomy between adversarial and inquisitorial systems has been 
widely used to characterize the procedural differences between legal systems,53 lawyers’ roles 
are not necessarily distinguishable along adversarial and inquisitorial lines.  For example, one 
scholar notes that the rift between the lawyer’s role in the “adversarial” and “inquisitorial” 
systems is not as wide as one might think.54  In fact, a report prepared by Austrian lawyers 
“suggests a completely reversed perspective with respect to these gross generalizations 
concerning the role of the American lawyer and Austrian lawyer,” namely, that “the Austrian 
lawyer ... is [the] vigorous advocate of the client’s interests ... whereas the lawyer from the 
Anglo-American tradition puts the duty to find the truth at least as high, if not higher, than the 
duty of loyalty to a client.”55
Furthermore, lawyer’s roles are fluid and changeable even within one system.  US 
lawyers serve a variety of roles, including “civil advocate, adviser, prosecutor and lawyer for 
governmental organizations.”56  Rogers does not explain why her functional approach describes 
and prescribes the differences in ethical rules in the international arena, yet does not explain the 
sometimes vast differences between states’ ethical rules within the domestic context of the US, 
where, one would assume, the same cultural values would result in the same role for lawyers.57
In many European countries the roles played by the members of the legal profession differ 
widely enough from one another that there are actually a variety of names for legal 
53Carrie Menkel-Meadows, The Limits of Adversarial Ethics, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE 125 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000).
54Terry Part I, supra note 51, at 49 n.194 (citing Professor Luban for the conclusion that “German lawyers [a]re really operating on an 
adversary basis, notwithstanding the tradition comments about ‘inquisitorial systems’”).
55Terry Part II, supra note 51, at 389–390.
56Menkel-Meadows, supra note 53, at 126.
57Vagts, supra note 3, at 678 (noting the tenacity of divergence among state ethical rules, despite long-standing model rules)
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professionals.58
There are, in any case, a diversity of viewpoints about the nature of the lawyers’ role—
among systems as well as under a given unitary procedural framework.  The best 
characterization of the lawyer’s role in international arbitration is as manifesting a combination 
of traits from different national systems.  Indeed, international arbitration has become 
increasingly more American or  adversarial59 as it has expanded and developed from its origins 
as a private dispute mechanism among the “grand of men” of Europe.60  Rogers’ imposition of 
the binary divide in her characterization of adversarial and inquisitorial systems belies an 
adversarial way of thinking, and her goal of promulgating an original ethical code for arbitration 
could itself be viewed as a reflection of this process of Americanization.61
2. The Differences in Forms of National Codes of Professional Conduct Are 
Relevant to Evaluating Professional Ethics in the International Sphere.
One of the assumptions Rogers makes in her proposal for a code of ethics in the context 
of international arbitration is that lawyers hailing from different jurisdictions will share an 
understanding of the form of professional ethics and that disagreement will only arise as to the 
appropriate content of those rules.  Codes of professional responsibility take different forms 
across jurisdictions.  For example, there are vast gaps in the specificity of professional rules 
governing conflicts of interest.  The US rules “are among the strictest in the world,”62 whereas 
other nations’ rules mention conflicts only in the most general of terms, on the theory that 
“conflicts are a matter of [personal] ethics, not law.”63  In France, for example, “the Code of 
58Terry Part I, supra note 51, at 10 (describing the variety of names for legal professionals used in European countries).
59Karamanian, supra note 1; see also, Mary C. Daly, The Dichotomy Between Standards and Rules: A New Way of Understanding the 
Differences in Perceptions of Lawyer Codes of Conduct by U.S. and Foreign Lawyers, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1117, 1142 (1999) (noting 
that the “‘judicialization’ of professional responsibility is a distinctive feature of the U.S. legal system”(emphasis added)).
60Menkel-Meadows, supra note 1, at 958.
61Menkel-Meadows, supra note 53, at 125 (“[T]he juxtaposition of adversarial to inquisitorial frameworks itself illustrates a primary 
deficiency of adversarial thinking—an assumption of two presumed opposites.”)
62Toulmin, supra note 52 at 681.
63Daly supra note 59, at 1149 (quoting Justin Castillo, International Law Practice in the 1990s: Issues of Law, Policy, and Professional 
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Conduct governing the notarial attorneys has no specific provisions on conflicts of interest. The 
notarial attorney simply has to put the interest of his client before his own interest.”64
The cultural divide goes deeper than this however.  The legal professions in jurisdictions 
around the globe are at different stages of development with respect to the rules and standards of 
ethical conduct.  Some European countries have only general ethics guidelines, if they have any 
codified ethics rules at all.65  Ever increasing transnational practice and the growth of 
international arbitration may well encourage the development of more specific and codified 
ethical rules in jurisdictions where those rules are as yet uncodified.  
The ABA Model Rules and the CCBE Code each represent the current status of the 
historical development of professional ethics in the US and the EU, respectively.  One scholar 
describes the progression of ethical rules over time as one from standards to rules of conduct.66
The US rules have developed further toward the rules end of the spectrum, as evidenced by a 
level of specificity that European regulations have not yet achieved.  The generality of the 
European regulations is however not perceived as a deficiency.67  Indeed, Europeans do not want 
or need more specific professional rules and regulations.  Professor Hazard has reported that 
“[t]he English barristers [think] it quaint that American lawyers [feel] in need of legal rules for 
Ethics, 86 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 272, 283 (1992)). 
64Daly, supra note 59 at 1149 n.165 (quoting Olivier d'Ormesson, French Perspectives on the Duty of Loyalty: Comparisons with the 
American View, in Rights, Liability, and Ethics).
65Daly, supra note 59 at 1149–1150 & 1150 n.169 (noting that some countries rely on oral tradition for rules of professional conduct, 
that the codes in France and Italy are much less specific than the US code of conduct, and that Mexico has no code of ethics at all); Terry, Part II, 
supra note 52 at 384. 
66Daly, supra note 59, at 1124 (“Understanding the standards / rules dichotomy is an important first step in the creation of a cross-
border code of lawyer conduct”).
67Commentators have identified the benefits of general standards over specific rules with respect to the current EU regulations as well 
as historical US regulations.  Compare Terry Part I, supra note 52 at 16 (regarding current EU regulation, quoting the CCBE Compendium: 
“Codes ... have limitations. They have more often more often a dissuasive effect than a positive impetus. ... They are attempts to capture on paper 
an approved pattern of behavior, a desired moral climate, an answer to all questions of conduct – which cannot be adequately captured on 
paper”), with Daly, supra note 59, at 1126 (describing the reasoning behind the “vague” standards of the 1908 Canons of Ethics, quoting the 
Preamble: “no code or set of rules can be framed, which will particularize all the duties of the lawyer in the varying phases of litigation or in all 
the relations of professional life”).
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their governance, but they recalled that Americans seemed to need rules for everything.”68
Professor Daly describes the historical development of the self-regulation of the 
American legal profession as a steady movement away from an early reliance on the 
interconnectedness within the “mini-communities” of lawyers within the profession for 
regulation.69  Each of these subsections of the profession “had its own shared understandings of 
the ethical standards governing its members” and functioned with a self-contained, largely 
informal regulatory system.70  As the American legal progression expanded, diversified, and the 
disciplinary mechanisms became more “regularized,” “professionalized,” and institutionalized,71
the demand for “clearer, more sharply framed directives”72 of professional conduct for lawyers 
grew.  The 1908 Canons of Ethics was surpassed by the 1969 Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility, which gave way to the 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct.73
The development of the CCBE Code provides an interesting historical parallel to the 
development of US domestic legal ethics.  Professor Terry notes the ready comparison between 
the 1977 Declaration of Perugia and the 1908 Canons of Legal Ethics,74 and the correlation 
between the 1988 CCBE Code and the 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility.75  The 
developments on both sides were motivated by similar changes in circumstances, including 
greater diversification of the legal community and movement within it.  A comment Justice 
Stone’s made on the state of the American legal profession in 1934 could just as easily be 
applied to the European legal profession in period before the promulgation of the CCBE code:  
68Daly, supra note 59, at 1121;  Terry Part I, supra note 52, at 16.
69Daly, supra note 59, at 1126.
70Id.
71Id. at 1137.
72Id. at 1128.
73Id. at 1125–31 (describing the progression from canons to codes to rules).
74Terry Part I, supra note 52, at 9.  
75Terry Part I, supra note 52 at 15–16 (“The concerns ... about the nature and shape of the CCBE Code mirror many of the same 
concerns that appeared in the United States revolving around whether the approach of the Model Rules  should be used in place of the established 
Model Code approach,” but that while the CCBE provides “black letter rules” it is “‘leaner’ than the Model Rules”). 
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“the petty details of form and manners which have been so largely the subject of our codes of 
ethics ... Our canons of ethics for the most part are generalizations designed for an earlier era.”76
The drafters of the CCBE remarked that “rudimentary rules met simpler circumstances, more 
refined and detailed rules now meet more complex circumstances.”77  Despite the strides made 
by the EU toward a rules-based as opposed to standards-based framework for professional 
conduct, the legal profession in Europe remains less institutionalized than in the US,78 and 
regulation remains less regularized and professionalized.79
The state of affairs of ethical regulation in the practice of international arbitration stands 
essentially at the same crossroads where the American legal profession found itself in the early 
part of the century and which motivated the adoption by the European nations of the CCBE Code 
in the early 1990s.80  International arbitration is no longer the “gentlemen’s club” run by a “cadre 
of ‘grand old men’” that it used to be.81  Whereas “differences [among the ethical obligations 
binding attorneys] were mute when international arbitration was run by a small group of 
insiders,” the growth and diversification of the practice had rendered these differences 
disruptive.82
Rogers’ theory simply does not account for the current divergence of the form of 
professional rules across jurisdictions.  In order to truly level the playing field of ethical 
regulation in international arbitration, we must account for differences in both the form and 
content of national ethical regulation.  It might be just as difficult for the British barrister to
76Daly, supra note 59, at 1127 (citing Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1934)).
77Terry Part I, supra note 52, at 16 n.54 (quoting the CCBE Compendium).
78Id. at 11 (referring to the “incomplete institutionalization of the legal profession in Europe”).
79Daly, supra note 59 at 1160–1161 (noting that CCBE Code could be seen as a shift toward rules, but that the shift is in no way 
wholehearted). 
80Cf. Abel, supra note 2, at 750 (“Transnational lawyers are significantly deprofessionalized.  In this they increasingly resemble their 
competitors in offices of house counsel and accounting firms, as well as their predecessors – lawyers before the emergence of strong professional 
associations”).
81Menkel-Meadows, supra note 1, at 959.
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adjust to myriad detailed ethical rules as it is for the German lawyer to adjust to a rule that 
permitted him to prepare his witnesses for their testimony.  The project of ascertaining which 
ethics rules should apply to lawyers in the context of international arbitration must be informed 
by the background of  historical development of ethical rules in other contexts and the continued 
divergence in the form of national professional ethics rules.
3. Hybrid Procedures in International Arbitration Reflect Compromises 
Between International Legal Systems.
Whereas Rogers argues that we should understand the hybrid procedures found in 
international arbitration as a manifestation of the normative goals of that system, including 
neutrality, effective resolution of disputes, and party autonomy, I agree with Professor Andreas 
Lowenfeld that hybrid procedures are better understood as compromises between international 
systems.  Professor Lowenfeld argues that procedures developed for use in international 
arbitration represent the best of both the civil and common law worlds.83  He remarks that “many 
of the techniques and approaches developed in one context are indeed portable, that is they are 
capable of being adapted to use in different contexts and different fora from those for which they 
were originally planned.”84  He further observes that the exchange of procedural ideas between 
arbitration and litigation is a two-way street:  Arbitration borrows procedure from litigation, but 
litigation can also be influenced by procedures that have proved effective in arbitration.85
According to Lowenfeld, therefore, procedures don’t necessarily represent the underlying 
normative goals of the international arbitration system, but rather, flow from an interactive 
dialogue between the lawyers who each bring knowledge of their own procedural frameworks.  
82Rogers, supra note 3, at 357.
83Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Elements of Procedure: Are They Separately Portable?, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 649, 654 (“Altogether, I 
think international arbitrators have gotten it about right - better than civil litigation in New York or Paris or Rome - without any treaty or 
universal rules or other act of creation”).
84Id. at 655.
85Id. at 654 (noting that the arbitration practice of distributing witness statements in advance of testimony has been “adopted in 
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Ultimately, international arbitration and international domestic legal systems reflect a certain 
amount of convergence, generally in the direction of Americanization.86  The fact that the 
International Bar Association’s Rules of Evidence for Arbitration provide for cross-examination, 
some discovery by the parties,87 and testimony by party witnesses, reflects a “mild” form of 
Americanization.88
By Rogers’ own estimation, international arbitration has become “more formalized and 
legalized,” “judicialized,” and “sophisticated.”89  Given this fact in conjunction with the 
evidence that arbitral procedures reflect measured compromises between national regimes, it is 
no stretch to claim that arbitration has become tantamount to “offshore litigation.”90  Why, then, 
shouldn’t the conflicts of laws approach we take to professional ethics other cross-border 
practice seamlessly carry over to the international arbitration context?  The more similar 
international arbitration and litigation become, the less need there is for a wholesale new 
professional ethics code.  In light of Lowenfeld’s description of the procedural rules in 
international arbitration as a compromise in progress, Rogers’ theory that the procedures of 
international arbitration embody a fundamentally different role for the lawyer seems incorrect. 
Under Rogers’ functional approach, the role of the lawyer is hard and fast and the 
differences between the civil and common law legal systems are discernible and definitive.  In 
the context of the individual countries’ national legal professions, such narrowly defined roles 
are hard to pin down, however.  The ethics rules that Rogers claims express the lawyer’s role 
American civil trials”).
86Vagts, supra note 3, at 680 (“Internationally, one sees signs of a certain amount of convergence between systems as other countries 
adjust their rules in the direction of the American norm”); Karamanian, supra note 2 (discussing the “Americanization” of international 
arbitration).
87Although, Lowenfeld insists that discovery in arbitration is much more limited, reflecting yet another compromise between the civil 
and common law procedural systems. Lowenfeld, supra note 91, at 654.
88Karamanian, supra note 1, at 10.
89Rogers, supra note 3, at 353–54.
90Id.
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seem to be more readily described in terms of the institutionalization and historical development 
of the profession.  The procedures that she argues provide the foundation for the lawyer’s role in 
international arbitration represent a set of strategic compromises made between lawyers familiar 
with different legal systems in an effort to facilitate adjudication.  By describing international 
arbitration in terms of its procedural development and by exposing the historical contingency of 
the form of ethics codes, I have attempted to deprive Rogers’ theory of its central premise that 
the lawyer’s role in international arbitration is unique and fundamentally different from her role
in national legal systems.  If this is not the case, and if the lawyer’s role in international 
arbitration is an amalgam of adversarial- and inquisitorial-style procedures that govern the 
proceeding,91 there is no need to fabricate an ethics code for international arbitration out of 
whole cloth.  If the lawyer practicing international arbitration is simply a lawyer in a novel 
venue,92 there is no reason that conflicts of laws principles, which have historically been used to 
ascertain the ethics rules applicable to lawyers in novel venues, should not apply.  The following 
section argues that US and EU ethics codes currently affirmatively apply conflicts of laws to 
international arbitration.  The subsequent section argues that conflicts of laws should be used to 
determine the applicable ethics rules in international arbitration.
B. National Disciplinary Authorities Have Explicitly Invoked Conflicts of Law to 
Address Issues Arising in Connection with International Arbitration.
National regulatory authorities have several bases of prescriptive jurisdiction which 
permit them to regulate attorney conduct in international fora.93  The problem arises “when 
91Vagts, supra note 1, at 260 (“The way in which a case is tried before an international tribunal ... depends greatly on the composition 
of the panel. It may come close to an Anglo-American adversarial model or may tend toward a civil law pattern”).
92Block, supra note 8, at 21 (“The international arbitration bar is a glaring misnomer as the practitioners in the field are a random 
collection of lawyers from around the world”);  Smit, supra note 1, at 11 (“In international arbitration, parties frequently use the lawyers they 
customarily use in their principle place of business, even if the arbitration takes place in another country”).
93Vagts, supra note 3, at 689 (citing territoriality (states can regulate conduct of lawyers who act within their territory), nationality 
(states can regulate conduct of lawyers who are their citizens), and effects (states can regulate conduct of lawyers who cause effects in their 
territory)).
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multiple states have legitimate power to, and an interest in, regulating the same conduct.”94
Rogers identifies the problem as “a risk that an attorney will be subject to conflicting 
obligations.”95   As noted above, I would re-characterize the problem as a lack of notice to the 
lawyers as to which obligations they are subject to.  Conflicts of law doctrine provides a method 
to “identify and evaluate the competing policies behind different rules in order to determine 
which should prevail.”96  This approach shares Rogers’ goal of leveling the playing field and 
ensuring that all lawyers in a proceeding are subject to the same rules.97  The 2002 version of the 
ABA Model Rule 8.5 and the CCBE Code both provide conflicts of laws rules that apply in case 
of cross-border or international practice including international arbitration. 
1. ABA Model Rule 8.5 Applies a Conflicts of Law Approach to 
Professional Ethics in the Context of International Arbitration.
As discussed above, the question practitioners in international arbitration must ask 
themselves is: Which ethical rules must I abide by?  The implied question is: If my conduct were 
to become subject to a disciplinary proceeding, under what rules would it be evaluated?98  The 
new version of ABA Model Rule 8.5 “Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law” answers this 
question for lawyers engaged in international arbitration by providing “relatively simple, bright-
line rules”99 designed to “facilitate international law practice.”100  And, as long as it is clear to 
practitioners what rules they will be held to account for at the end of the day, they will know 
94Rogers, supra note 6, at 23–24.
95Id. 
96Vagts, supra note 3, at 678, 698 (discussing the application of common law conflicts of laws doctrine, including the 2d Restatement 
test and governmental interest analysis as these approaches have been applied by courts in the context of malpractice suits).
97Id. at 692, 690. 
98See supra note 47.
99Daly, supra note 2, at 757.
100Id.; See also, MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5 cmt. 7 (2002) (noting that the choice of law provision applies to 
“transnational practice, unless international law, treaties or other agreements between competent regulatory authorities in the affected 
jurisdictions provide otherwise.”); VAGTS, ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS, 18–20 (2003)(commenting on the application of the 
2002 version of Model Rul 8.5 to international practice).
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what rules to follow initially.101
The 2002 version of the Model Rule 8.5 embodies an interest analysis approach to 
conflicts of law.  Interest analysis holds that a particular law is applicable to a given factual 
situation only if that factual situation implicates the purpose of the law.102  This purposive 
approach would dictate, therefore, that a German rule prohibiting pre-testimonial 
communications does not govern an arbitration proceeding in which procedural rules provide for 
counsel to conduct direct and cross-examination of their witnesses.  This is because the purpose 
of the prohibition (maintenance of unadulterated evidence for the judge) is not promoted in a 
proceeding where the lawyers are each required to present their versions of the facts by way of 
witness examination.103  This example is discussed more fully below. 
Each provision of Rule 8.5 reflects this purposive approach.  The self-identified purpose 
of the Model Rules is to define the relationship between lawyers and the legal system as part of 
the self-government of the autonomous legal profession.104  The provision of Rule 8.5 governing 
lawyer conduct other than in the context of a proceeding before a tribunal manifests an intent to 
apply the rules of a jurisdiction only to conduct which implicates the relationship between 
lawyers and the legal system in that jurisdiction.  It premises application of a jurisdiction’s ethics 
rules on contacts that are relevant to this relationship, namely the place of the lawyer’s conduct, 
or the “predominant effect” of the conduct.105
Professor Daly has criticized the “predominant effect” standard in previous versions of 
101Cf. Daly, supra note 2, at 790 (regarding the prior version of the Model Rule: “it is not very useful for lawyers seeking guidance 
about future conduct”).
102Larry Kramer, The Myth of the Unprovided-for Case, 75 VA. L. REV. 1045 (1989); see also, Industrial Indemnity Company v. 
Chapman and Culter, 22 F. 3d 1346, 1350 (1994) (describing California’s governmental interest approach).
103Thus, Rogers’ concern that conflicts of law might result in the application of an ethical rule that would not agree with the procedural 
rules of an arbitration is unwarranted.
104MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble, paras. 10, 12 & 13. 
105MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b)(2) (“for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer’s conduct
occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct.”)
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this Rule as vague and difficult to apply.106  The force of that critique is lessened by the addition 
of a safety catch for lawyer’s conduct that “conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the 
lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer’s conduct will occur” designed 
to protect “lawyers who act reasonably in the face of uncertainty.”107  Despite the fact that the 
rule writers do not provide a “method” whereby lawyers could ascertain the jurisdiction of 
predominant effect, as Daly would have liked,108 the writers seem to indicate that a lawyer’s 
“reasonable” determination will be accepted.  Indeed, Daly herself suggested the inclusion of a 
“reasonableness requirement,” noting that “requiring reasonableness prevents lawyers from 
taking advantage of their ability to ‘choose’.”109 Because the current version of Rule 8.5 
relies on the place of conduct along with the reasonableness requirement, it is likely to lead to the 
application of the rules of a state that has an interest in regulating that conduct.  The place where 
conduct that affects this relationship occurs has a greater interest in having its rules of ethics 
apply than does the jurisdiction in which the lawyer happened to be licensed, for example, as 
under the previous version of the Rule.
Lawyer conduct in international arbitrations will fall under the provision governing 
conduct in connection with matters before tribunals.  The historical choice of law rule of the situs 
would apply the ethical rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal is located.  This is 
articulated in Rule 8.5, which provides that “the rules of the jurisdiction in which a tribunal sits” 
shall apply.  As Rogers points out, it does not make sense for the ethics rules of a state that is 
hosting an arbitration to apply merely because it is the situs of the arbitration.110  The Model 
106Daly, supra note 2, at 760.
107MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b)(2) cmt. 3. 
108Daly, supra 2, at 760–61.
109Daly, supra note 2, at 797.
110Rogers, supra note 6, at 3.
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Rules account for this concern by further providing that the rules of the tribunal have preeminent 
authority to designate which ethics rules shall apply.111  Rogers’ suggestion that arbitral tribunals 
should promulgate full-fledged codes of ethics to regulate the lawyers who appear before them is 
however unnecessary.  In order to regulate the attorneys, arbitral tribunals need only provide a 
choice of law rule which invokes extant regulatory systems where the purposes of those 
regulations are implicated.
Rogers’ critique of the choice of law approach centers on her allegation that this approach 
falsely views “ethical norms as freestanding precepts, which are independently modifiable and 
interchangeable.”112  On my reading, the approach taken by the Model Rules does not view 
“ethical norms as ... independently modifiable,” but rather recognizes the fact that rules of ethics 
have specific purposes and should only be applied to lawyers’ conduct when those purposes are 
implicated.  The Model Rule 8.5 explicitly applies a conflicts of laws approach informed by 
interest analysis to international arbitrations.
2. The CCBE Code Applies a Conflicts of Laws Approach to Cross-border 
Practice Including International Arbitration.
The CCBE Code operates slightly differently than the ABA Model Rules.  Like Model 
Rule 8.5, the CCBE Code applies to international arbitrations.113  Whereas the ABA Rules apply 
primarily to domestic practice and have a few provisions that address multijurisdictional practice 
(including international arbitration), the CCBE Code was designed solely to address issues 
surrounding cross-border practice in Europe.114  Further, when the ABA Rules are adopted in 
whole or in part by the individual states the Rules become the substantive content of that state’s 
111MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b)(2) (“the rules of the jurisdiction in which a tribunal sits, unless the rules of the 
tribunal provide otherwise”).
112Rogers, supra note 3, at 379.
113See CCBE Code R. 4.5 “Extension to Arbitrators” that provides that “the rules governing a lawyer’s relations with the courts apply 
also to his relations with arbitrators and any other persons exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, even on an occasional basis.”
114See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text.
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disciplinary system.  On the other hand, a European state’s adoption of the CCBE Code merely 
supplements the ethics rules and disciplinary system already in place in the adoptive state by 
providing rules for cross-border practice.  In this way, the whole of the CCBE code can be 
loosely analogized to Model Rule 8.5. 
Professor Terry characterizes the Code as one which provides a series of conflicts of laws 
rules indicating which national ethics rules should apply, rather than setting forth a “universally 
acceptable ‘legal ethics’ code.”115  The Code was intended to prevent the simultaneous 
application of conflicting ethical rules (“double deontology”), without necessarily “adopting a 
particular substantive position” (“single deontology”).116  The CCBE Code provisions on 
“incompatible occupations,” “advertising,” and “confidentiality of communications between 
lawyers” provide such conflicts of laws guidance that directs lawyers to follow a given state’s 
rule under specified circumstances instead of dictating a new rule.117  Other provisions, for 
example, that on ex parte communications, combine a substantive component with a choice of 
law rule.  This rule forbids ex parte communications “unless [they] ... are permitted under the 
relevant rules of procedure.”118  In a manner similar to that of the Rule 8.5 provision that defers 
to the rules of the tribunal, the CCBE Code incorporates the principles underlying interest 
analysis by recognizing that a tribunal before which a lawyer appears has a greater interest in 
regulating the conduct of that lawyer than does the state.119
The CCBE Code likewise applies its conflicts of law approach to determining which 
115Terry Part I, supra note 52, at 18. See also, Vagts, supra note 3, at 678  n.5 (noting that the CCBE Code “turns out to contain many 
instances in which it in effect resorts to conflict of laws solutions rather than providing uniform rules”).
116Terry Part I, supra note 52, at 18.
117Id. at 25. 
118Id. at 37.
119The CCBE Code, R. 4.1. (“A lawyer who appears, or takes part in a case before a court or tribunal in a Member State, must comply 
with the rules of conduct applied before that court or tribunal.”)de4
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rules of professional conduct should apply to international arbitration.120  A hint of interest 
analysis is apparent in certain rules of the Code that seek to level the playing field between 
lawyers from jurisdictions which may have more specific and restrictive rules and those from 
jurisdictions with less restrictive rules.  For example, the CCBE Code rule governing conflicts of 
interest is surprisingly strict, given the vagueness or non-existence of conflicts of interest rules in 
many of the  CCBE member states.121  In an cross-border arbitration in which the parties were 
represented by a lawyer from a jurisdiction with a specific conflicts of interest rule and a lawyer 
from a jurisdiction with a vague conflicts of interest rule, the CCBE Rule would govern so that 
these lawyers could be prevented from representing their clients in the event of a conflict even if 
their national rule would not have prevented the representation.  In terms of interest analysis, the 
CCBE prioritizes the states’ interest in preventing conflicts over the interest in promoting 
freedom of representation.  The restrictive rule guarantees that in all cases, the state interest in 
preventing conflicts is upheld.  In sum, the CCBE Code applies a conflicts of law approach that 
incorporates the competing regulatory interests of the European nations to cross-border practice, 
including international arbitration.
3. Conflicts of Laws Rules for Professional Ethics in International 
Arbitration Should Be Decided by the Tribunals.
Given that national regulation, including the ABA Model Rules122 and the CCBE Code, 
apply choice of law rules to lawyer conduct in the context of international arbitration, the next 
question is: Which choice of law rules should be followed?  For example, in an international 
arbitration proceeding between German and American parties, held in Geneva, which choice of 
120The CCBE Code, Rule 4.5 extends the application of all provisions referring to “courts” to arbitrations and other “judicial or quasi-
judicial” institutions.
121Terry, Part I, supra note 52, at 31, and 31 n. 118.
122The practical matter of application of the Model Rules depends, of course, on whether the individual states have adopted those 
Rules.  The adoption of the current Model Rule 8.5 in New York is still pending, and the rule currently in force in that state corresponds to the 
prior version of the rule. See ABA “State Implementation of Model Rule 8.5," http://www.abanet.org/cpr/jclr/8_5_quick_guide.pdf; ABA Ad 
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law rules determine the ethics rules that will apply—the CCBE Code or Model Rule 8.5?  The 
companion inquiry is: Who should best decide? 
Private international adjudication, due to the fact that it implicates the regulatory interests 
of multiple sovereigns, will inevitably encounter conflicting regulations.  The real problem with 
conflicts of law is not resolving these conflicts but rather the potential for diversity in the 
approaches to the rules for resolving them.  In order to obtain certainty, uniformity, and 
predictability, and to provide lawyers with notice as to the applicable ethical rules, arbitral 
tribunals must be clear in their application of choice of law rules.  In the same way that the 
CCBE Code has “harmonized the ‘conflicts of laws’ choices facing a lawyer” engaged in cross-
border practice in Europe, international arbitration needs to harmonize and clarify the application 
of conflict of laws rules so that all lawyers involved in the same arbitral proceeding will be 
governed by the same ethical regulations.123
As to the question of which conflicts of laws rules should be applied, there are a variety 
of possible answers.  As discussed above, the Model Rules and the CCBE Code each provide 
approaches to conflicts issues.  Arbitrators have the authority to develop and apply conflicts of 
laws rules.  This authority comports fully with their adjudicatory role.  Furthermore,  given the 
deference of national ethics rules to rules of specific tribunals, arbitrator authority to determine 
conflicts of laws rules does not undermine the regulatory interests of the nations whose lawyers 
practice before those tribunals.  The comment to Model Rule 8.5 supports placing the authority 
to determine choice of law rules with the tribunal insofar as it anticipates and defers to the 
tribunal’s choice of law rule: “The lawyer shall be subject only to the rules of the jurisdiction in 
Hoc Comm. on Multijurisdictional Practice, Approved by the Executive Comm. NYCLA, Report of January 29, 2001; NY CLS Jud. Appx Code 
Prof’l Resp. § 1200.5-a, DR 1-105 (2005).
123Terry Part I, supra note 52, at 45.
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which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal, including its choice of law rule, provide 
otherwise.”124  Also, a choice of law determination by the arbitral tribunal would indicate to the 
relevant nationally based disciplinary authority the standards against which the lawyer’s conduct 
should be measured in the event of a disciplinary proceeding.
There is precedent for allowing an arbitral tribunal to develop a conflicts of law rule in 
the context of the application of substantive law.  A tribunal’s choice of law determination can 
either be invoked on an ad hoc basis, or it can be built into the rules of the tribunal.  Certain 
tribunals exemplify the ad hoc approach by allowing the arbitrator to determine which law will 
govern in the event the party’s agreement does not specify the governing law.125  ICSID provides 
an example where the rules of the arbitral tribunal stipulate the choice of law rule: “[A]rticle 
42(1) of the ICSID rules mandates that, in the absence of party agreement, the arbitrators apply 
the ‘law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its conflict-of-laws) and such 
rules of international law as may be applicable’.”126
In sum, national ethics rules do apply to lawyer conduct in the context of international 
arbitration.  It is consistent with the structure of arbitration proceedings to apply conflicts of laws 
rules to determine which ethics rules should apply to the conduct of the lawyers in the 
proceeding.  Arbitral tribunals have the authority to make such conflicts determinations, and 
national rules make clear that disciplinary authorities will defer to such determinations in any 
subsequent disciplinary action against an attorney.  In this way, lawyers practicing in 
international arbitration will benefit from the transparency and accessibility of rules specific to 
the tribunal and the equity and fairness of complying with the same ethics rules with which their 
124MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5 cmt. 4.
125Rogers, supra note 3, at  421 n.382 (citing W. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES, 
MATERIALS, AND NOTES ON THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES (1997)).
126Id.
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colleagues comply.  
C. The Conflicts of Laws Approach to Ethical Regulation in International Arbitration 
Respects Both the Coequal Sovereignty of National Disciplinary Authorities and 
the Independence of the Legal Profession.
It is important to remember that the tribunals of the international arbitration system are 
not international or supranational courts.127  They are privately administrated bodies that provide 
private dispute resolution to, in large part, private parties.  One of the reasons that arbitration is 
such a highly prized form of dispute settlement is that national sovereigns respect the private 
nature of these tribunals by enforcing awards made by them largely without question.128  Despite 
this, national sovereigns nevertheless maintain an interest in regulating the professional conduct 
of their lawyers practicing in private international adjudication.129  Ethical regulation in the 
context of international arbitration must account for the coequal sovereignty of the nations 
implicated in the arbitration as well as the independence of the legal professions of those nations.
The principle of coequal sovereignty of nations is critical to the international legal sphere, 
including arbitration.  Rogers asserts that “the goals of ethical regulation are to guide, punish, 
and deter attorney conduct in an effort to protect clients and third parties, and to ensure the 
proper functioning of the state adjudicatory apparatus.”130  These goals are equally important and 
equally well-served by the application of state rules of ethics to lawyer conduct, regardless of 
whether the conduct is in the context of a domestic court, a domestic arbitration, or an 
international arbitration.  The very nature of our federalist system at the domestic level and the 
127Id. at 342.
128New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 5, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 
U.N.T.S. 38.
129Rogers, supra note 6, at 4 (“nation-states retain an interest in the regulation of the behavior of lawyers who are licensed in their 
jurisdictions and whose work affects the rights and obligations of their citizens”)
130Rogers, supra note 6, at 20 n.93 (quoting Joint Committee on Prof’l Discipline: ‘The purpose of lawyer discipline ... is to maintain 
appropriate standards of professional conduct in order to protect the public and the administration of justice from lawyers who have demonstrated 
by their conduct that they are unable to likely to be unable to properly discharge their professional duties”).
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system of Westphalian sovereignty at the international level allows for varied, conflicting, and 
from time to time completely incompatible ethical rules.  The “coexistence” of national 
regulatory systems is simply part and parcel of the relations among nations on the international 
plane.  If international arbitration is viewed as an example of the interaction of sovereign nations 
there is no way – feasible or desirable – to devise a way of avoiding conflicts between ethical 
rules that apply to the lawyers practicing in it.  Even as the ABA Multijurisdictional Practice 
Commission prepared the new version of Model Rule 8.5 in an attempt to facilitate the ever-
growing interstate practice, it “reaffirm[ed] the principle of state judicial regulation of 
lawyers.”131  Both the ABA and the CCBE have provided tools to resolve inconsistencies in the 
interstate and inter-European context that deliberately allow for various interests of the 
disciplinary authorities to be accommodated.  
International tribunals do not  have an interest in regulating attorney conduct,132 rather 
they merely have an interest in the fairness and equity of their proceedings.  That interest can be 
satisfactorily fulfilled by invoking extant national rules and mechanisms through application of 
conflicts of laws principles.133  Where Rogers’ observes that the tribunal is in the best position to 
discipline the lawyers before it because it is best acquainted with their conduct makes intuitive 
sense, Professor Vagts notes that the apparent practical convenience is illusory in that 
“[e]xercising that power [to discipline] might ... be diversionary and counterproductive.”134
The way in which Rogers’ functional approach contravenes the coequal sovereignty of 
nations can be best illustrated in terms of her proposed enforcement mechanism.  In “Context 
131ABA Comm. on Multijurisdictional Practice, Report of August, 2002 at 6, http://www.acca.com/advocacy/mjp/finalmjp.pdf.
132This is not to say that an arbitral tribunal does not have an interest in having regulated attorneys appear before it, but simply that the 
tribunal’s interest does not extend to providing that regulation itself.
133As discussed above, in contrast to Rogers’ repeated assertion that “international arbitration is intentionally disassociated from 
sovereigns, [so that] there is no obvious source for regulating participating attorneys,” the current national rules expose a clear intention on the 
part of national regulatory authorities to extend the application of their rule to international arbitration. Rogers, supra note 6, at 2.
134Vagts, supra note 1, at 253. Contrast with Rogers’ assertion that “The fact that international arbitration is a private system does 
nothing to diminish [its] inherent need” to have the “tools” and “power” to regulate the attorneys before them.” Rogers, supra note 6, at 24.
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and Institutional Structure in Attorney Regulation: Constructing an Enforcement Regime for 
International Arbitration, ”135  Rogers argues that the functional approach should lead to ethical 
rules promulgated and enforce by the arbitral tribunals themselves.  That enforcement should 
take the form of disciplinary “sanctions” and published reprimands.  Under this regime, the 
arbitral tribunal, an organization with no international personality or sovereign authority, would 
effectively govern the conduct of citizens whose conduct is already regulated by their 
professional organizations.  As I argued above, there is nothing fundamentally different about a 
lawyer’s international arbitration practice to warrant its exemption from the usual professional 
regulation.  Rogers’ recommendation would displace sovereign regulation of lawyer conduct 
with a private regime under the sole authority of the arbitral tribunals. On the other hand, 
application of conflicts of laws rules to ethics in arbitral proceedings incorporates the sovereign 
authority of the nation of each lawyer’s citizenship by maintaining nationally based lawyer 
regulation.  Conflicts of laws seeks to ensure that national regulations are invoked when the 
sovereign’s regulatory interest is implicated.
A conflicts of laws approach likewise respects the independence of the legal profession—
a long-held and essential value of bars around the world.136  Organized bars promulgate rules of 
professional conduct for the very purpose of maintaining their independence.137  The very fact of 
the “professionalism” of the bar is intimately connected with its capacity of self-regulation.138
Professor Daly invoked these principles in an unequivocal argument against a proposal for a 
unitary national bar association in place of the current state bar system:  
“As a matter of policy, the proposal for a national bar threatens the independence 
135Rogers, supra note 6. 
136Rogers, supra note 3, at 365–67; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble. 
137Daly, supra note 2, at 749.
138Vagts, supra note 3, at 679–80.
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of the legal profession and should be rejected on this basis alone. State-based 
regulation preserves liberty. . . . The creation of a national bar would . . . lessen[] 
the protection of individual liberty.”139
The independence of the legal profession must likewise be maintained in the context of 
private international adjudication.  Application of conflicts of law to ethics rules in international 
arbitration supports and furthers the independence of the national bars by maintaining nationally 
based lawyer regulation.  By contrast, Rogers’ recommendation that international arbitrators 
should double as a disciplinary authorities and“sanction” attorney conduct that does not comply 
with the ethics rules promulgated by that tribunal completely contravenes this principle of 
independence.140  Involving an adjudicator as a ground floor disciplinarian threatens both 
sovereign regulatory authority of the lawyers respective nations and also the independence of 
legal profession.   
In this Part, I argued that the role of the lawyer in international arbitration is not 
fundamentally different from that her role in other contexts, as Rogers claims.  I conclude, in 
contrast to Rogers, that the national ethical regulations should apply to international arbitration.  
I have demonstrated that national rules explicitly do apply to international arbitration and that 
they call for a conflicts of laws approach in that context.  I have argued furthermore that conflicts 
of law incorporates the essential principles of coequal sovereignty of nations and the 
independence of the legal profession, whereas Rogers’ approach contravenes these principles. 
III. The Conflicts of Law Approach to Rule of Professional Conduct Is Practicable.
This final Part attempts to apply the conflicts of laws principles delineated above to a few 
different factual scenarios.141  These hypothetical examples will illustrate the ways in which a 
conflicts of laws approach furthers the interests of the national regulatory authorities, the arbitral 
139Daly, supra note 2, at 784 (emphasis added).
140Rogers, supra note 6, at 3–4. 
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tribunals and the lawyers themselves.  The examples should expose not only the complexity of 
conflicts of laws but the ultimate workability of the approach.142
A. Interstate Conflicts of Rules of Ethics Provide a Familiar Starting Point for 
Conflicts of Laws Analysis.
I begin with an example of an interstate conflict143 to juxtapose against the international 
examples in an attempt to expose the fundamental similarity in application of conflicts of law, 
regardless of whether the conflict is between states or nations.  
A law firm, “S & H” is based in New York and has a branch office in New Jersey for the 
sole purpose of providing services to a principle client, DX, a Delaware corporation which has 
its principle place of operations in New Jersey.  S & H has one partner, who is admitted both in 
New York and New Jersey, and three associates based at the New Jersey branch.  Two of the 
associates are admitted both in New York and New Jersey, and one is admitted only in New 
York.  S & H transfers a second partner, admitted in California, to the office.  DX reveals fraud it 
has committed to the partner in charge of its account.  The California rule would prohibit 
disclosure, the New Jersey rule would require disclosure under certain circumstances and New 
York rule would either prohibit disclosure or leave it to the lawyer’s discretion under certain 
circumstances.  The question is, of course: “Which jurisdiction's ethical rules govern the 
lawyers’ conduct?”144
Daly’s analysis and conclusion that the previous version of Model Rule 8.5 is wholly 
“unworkable” is based in large part on the centrality of the lawyer’s place of admission and 
141I have borrowed these hypotheticals from Professors Rogers, Daly and Vagts.
142Cf. Jay L. Krystinik, Comment: The Complex Web of Conflicting Disciplinary Standards in Litigation, 38 TEX. INT’L L. J. 815, 827 
n.121 (2003) (citing Gene R. Shreve, Conflicts of Law – State or Federal?, 68 IND. J. L. 907, 911 (1993)) (“Those of us who study conflicts must 
regret that it is law frequently unpopular with lawyers, judges, law students, and even law professors .... Chief among the reasons must be the 
daunting nature of the subject: difficulties in framing issues, in deciding between complex and, at times, contradictory approaches to a solution, 
and in applying the approach selected to the facts of the case.”).
143This example is borrowed from Professor Daly. I’ve abbreviated the facts. Daly, supra note 2, at 717. 
Submission:  July 20, 2006 Page 35 of 42
Kirsten Weisenberger
principle place of practice to the section of the rule governing conduct not related to a court 
proceeding.145  These criticisms are no longer applicable under the new formation of the rule, 
which premises jurisdiction on the place of conduct.  Her further contention that the lawyer 
attempting to ascertain place of the predominant effect of his conduct “has no assurance that 
either formula will be ultimately acceptable to the disciplinary authorities” has also been 
remedied under the new formula through the “reasonableness” safeguard provision, as discussed 
above at Part II(B)(1).146
The S & H lawyers’ evaluation of whether they must disclose DX’s fraud is undoubtedly 
a difficult task, but not an impossible one.  The first step of the application of Model Rule 8.5, is 
to determine whether the conduct is in connection with a matter before a tribunal.  It seems not to 
be.  Therefore, the second step falls under section 8.5(b)(2) governing conduct not related to a 
court proceeding.  That section requires that the lawyers pinpoint the place of conduct.  The 
partner to whom the fraud was revealed must evaluate where the relevant conduct—in this case 
disclosure of the fraud—would occur.  Probably the answer is New York or New Jersey, given 
that those are the jurisdictions in which this partner practices.  The next step is to  determine 
whether the disclosure would take predominant effect in a jurisdiction other than New York or 
New Jersey.  As Daly reasons, the disclosure would likely have effects in all the states in which 
DX did business and so it is impossible to ascertain a place of predominant effect.147  I would 
counter that given the partner’s intimate knowledge of DX’s operations, as well as the details of 
the fraud, that partner is probably in a position to make a reasonable determination as to the 
place where his disclosure of the company fraud would have its predominant effect.  The answer 
144Id. at 776.
145Id. at 777.
146Id.
147Id.
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might be New Jersey (DX’s primary place of operations), and it might be New York (the primary 
place of business of the banks affected by the fraud).  
Ultimately, the question of whether the lawyer gets the answer right is made eminently 
less critical by the reasonable basis provision of the new Model Rule.  Provided that the S & H 
attorneys approach the inquiry in good faith and formulate a reasonable basis for their ultimate 
decision as to the applicable rules, they will have assurance that any disciplinary authority that 
might eventually be confronted with their situation would apply those rules to their conduct.  
This example further illustrates the way in which the new Rule 8.5 captures a conflicts of 
law approach founded in interest analysis.  Although multiple states will be effected by the 
disclosure, or lack thereof, and therefore have an interest in applying their rule, the “predominant 
effect” standard seeks out the state with the greatest interest.  The lawyer is the person in the best 
position to make this determination because she can assess the consequences of disclosing the 
fraud in the context of everything she knows about the client matter.  It is therefore adventitious 
to assign the lawyer the tast of making this determination. 
B. International Conflicts Are Strikingly Similar to Interstate Conflicts.
Interestingly, Professor Vagts proposes nearly the same hypothetical in an international 
context.148  In his scenario, an American lawyer working in the German office of an American 
firm discovers a client’s plan to commit fraud.  The German rule would require disclosure, and, 
as we saw in the preceding example, the American rules on the subject differ wildly.  Elsewhere, 
Vagts notes that “the German lawyer’s duty to report is contained within a provision that relates 
to obligations of all Germans to assist in the forestalling of crime.”149  Under interest analysis, 
148Detlev Vagts, International Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 92 AM. SOC. INT’L L. PROC. 378, 379 (1998).
149Vagts, supra note 3, at 687.
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then, the German rule would not apply to this American lawyer.  The conduct of an American 
lawyer working for an American law firm does not implicate the purpose of the rule, which is to 
govern the conduct of German citizens within the German political community.  If the disclosure 
of the client’s fraud can be characterized as a matter of cross-border EU practice, the CCBE 
Code might apply.  In this case Rule 2.3, “Confidentiality,” unambiguously militates against 
disclosure of the fraud, as of any other client confidence.150
As one commentator observed, “[t]he discussion of which rules to apply becomes 
somewhat academic when one considers that the jurisdiction best able – and most likely – to 
pursue disciplinary action is the lawyer’s home jurisdiction.”151  It is certainly possible to 
imagine that if the lawyer did make the disclosure, a disciplinary action might well be brought in 
the US before a state disciplinary committee that had adopted Model Rule 8.5.  In this case, the 
lawyer could either argue that the rules of the jurisdiction where he made the disclosure, namely 
Germany, required that he do so, rendering the conduct permissible under the “place of conduct” 
provision of Rule 8.5.  In the alternative, he could argue that he reasonably believed the 
predominant effect of the disclosure would occur in a jurisdiction that required the disclosure 
(whether that jurisdiction was New York or some other state).  Again, as long as the lawyer 
considered the factors and structured his conduct to comply with the regulations that he 
reasonably determined should apply, the lawyer should be able to rest assured that he is immune 
from disciplinary action.
C. Conflicts in International Arbitration: Pre-trial Communication with Witnesses.
The two proceeding examples were intended to lay the groundwork for the application of 
conflicts of laws doctrine to ethics rules, I will now address a few examples specific to 
150CCBE CODE R. 2.3
151Krystinik, supra note 141, at 827.
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international arbitration.  First, Rogers’ “paradigmatic” conflict, introduced above, summarized 
neatly as the “witness preparation/tampering” issue.152 Significantly, this issue has been 
addressed by the International Bar Association as part of their “Rules on the Taking of Evidence 
in International Commercial Arbitration.”153  Specifically, Rule 4.3 provides: “It shall not be 
improper for a Party, its officers, employees, legal advisors or other representatives to interview 
its witnesses or potential witnesses.”154  This example sheds some light on a common sense 
solution to the purported problem of conflict between ethics and procedural rules.  Clearly, if the 
rules of the tribunal provide for preparation of witnesses by attorneys, it should not contravene 
the ethics rules of any relevant jurisdiction for attorneys before that tribunal to do so.  The 
combined effect of either the CCBE Code155 or Model Rule 8.5 and the IBA evidence rules will 
allow both the civil law and the common law lawyer to engage in strategic pre-testimonial 
communication with their respective witnesses in a fully ethical manner.  By standardizing this 
evidence rule applicable to international arbitration, the IBA has effectively harmonized the 
ethics rules regarding pre-testimonial communication with witnesses as well. 
The principles underlying conflicts of law interest analysis provide a ready justification 
for resolving conflicts of ethics rules through the backdoor of procedural or evidentiary rules.  
The two regulatory bodies allegedly competing for prescriptive jurisdiction are the state156
(which promulgated the ethical rule) and the arbitral tribunal (which promulgated the evidentiary
rule).  Let’s assume that the arbitration takes place in a civil law jurisdiction where pre-
testimonial communications are prohibited, but that the rules of the tribunal permit these 
152Rogers, supra note 3, at 360; Vagts, supra note 4, at 688.
153Block, supra note 8, at 18.
154INT’L BAR ASS’N RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION R. 4.3.
155CCBE CODE R. 4.1 “Applicable Rules of Conduct in Court.”
156Either the lawyer’s home state or the location of the tribunal.
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communications.  Can a lawyer, hailing from a civil law jurisdiction that likewise prohibits pre-
testimonial communications, ethically take depositions and interview witnesses prior to the 
hearing?  The first step in interest analysis is to look to the purposes of the laws of each 
regulatory entity.  The purpose of the state’s law prohibiting pre-testimonial communications is 
to maintain an untainted base of evidence to facilitate fact finding by the inquisitorial judge.157
The state’s interest, therefore, extends only to attorneys who are participating in the type of 
inquisitorial proceeding implicated by the rule.  The arbitration proceeding, by its own definition, 
is not such an inquisitorial setting.  Therefore, the state has no interest in preventing lawyers 
appearing before that tribunal from interviewing their witnesses before the fact.  This situation 
presents the classic “false conflict” where only one regulatory entity – in this case the arbitral 
tribunal – has an interest in having its rule apply to the case.158
The only remaining issue is the practical question of whether lawyers from different 
backgrounds and training will prepare their witnesses equally well or in the same qualitative 
way.159  Rogers recognizes this also, but claims that a “controlling rule” will bring different 
lawyers’ practice styles into alignment.160  Her conclusion that a uniform ethics code will create 
such alignment seems to underestimate the pervasive cultural differences among lawyers 
internationally.   As one practitioner stated: “Although it may be hard for lawyers in some 
jurisdictions to get used to this, at least the rule is clear.”161  This comment expresses the 
important idea that homogenizing the differences in practice styles among lawyers of vastly 
different education and experience takes much more than a rule of conduct.  One of the essential 
features of international arbitration is that it is international.  Lawyers from different traditions 
157Rogers, supra note 3, at 399 (noting that the prohibition on pre-testimonial communications reflects the lawyer’s role, not a 
tolerance for perjury).
158Kramer, supra note 102, at 1045.
159Block, supra note 8, at 18.
160Rogers, supra note 3, at 360 n.85
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represent opposing parties and have different ways of thinking about litigation.  I do not mean to 
declare the problem of conflicting ethical obligations insoluble, but merely to emphasize that a 
conflicts of law approach incorporates this reality, by respecting the regulatory authority of the 
implicated states while still allowing the tribunals’ ability to shape the conduct of lawyers in 
their proceedings. 
D. Conflicts in International Arbitration: Ex Parte Communications.
I take up Rogers’ example of ex parte communications with arbitrators as a final 
illustration of the conflicts of law approach in action.162  An American and a European represent 
opposing sides before an arbitral panel composed of two party-appointed and one neutral 
arbitrator in a proceeding under Swiss law.  The question is “whether it is permissible for the 
lawyer for one of the parties to the arbitration to communicate ex parte with the arbitrator whom 
that party appointed.”163
A conflicts of laws rule which applied the ethics rules of the situs of the tribunal would 
result in the application of the civil law rule allowing ex parte communications.  Interest analysis 
would look to the purpose of the American rule prohibiting ex parte communications:  to prevent 
one side from gaining an unfair advantage.164  If the structure of the proceeding is intended to 
equip each side with an advocate on the arbitral panel and maintain the neutrality of the third 
panelist, then the purpose of the US rule is only implicated with respect to ex parte 
communications with the neutral arbitrator.  The US rule would not bar communications with the 
party-appointed arbitrators.  Furthermore, under the situs rule, the US lawyer would be fully 
161Block, supra note 8.
162Rogers, supra note 3, at 392.  Since Rogers does not provide a specific factual scenario, I am borrowing the hypothetical from 
Professor Vagts. See Vagts, supra note 149, at 379.
163Id.
164Rogers, supra note 3, at 392
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justified in engaging in such ex parte communications under the ABA Model Rule 8.5, as she 
would be complying with the rules of the jurisdiction where the tribunal sits.165
The practice has developed in the opposite direction, however.  Ex parte communications 
are “not the norm in international arbitration.”166  Several organizations that issue arbitration 
rules and guidelines have come down on the side prohibiting ex parte communications and, 
therefore, encouraging the neutrality of all arbitrators.167  The CCBE Code has also resolved this 
conflict in favor of prohibiting ex parte communications, except where they are permitted “under 
the relevant rules of procedure.”168
Professor Menkel-Meadows refers to this situation as a “conflict of role.”169  Whereas 
Rogers’ functional approach emphasizes the derivation of the ethics rule from the role of the 
lawyer in a given procedural framework, this example of ex parte communications betrays the 
fact that the rub might actually be in ascertaining the role in the first place.  The debate about ex 
parte communications with party-appointed arbitrators exposes differing views about whether 
arbitrators should properly serve a partisan or a neutral role.  The counterpart to this debate 
regards the lawyer’s role and the extent to which the lawyer should advocate before a neutral 
panel or work with a member of that panel as a team – conflict of role, indeed.  As international 
arbitration grows and develops the roles lawyers play before its tribunals will surely develop and 
change as well.  As procedural and evidentiary rules are drafted and revised, they will reflect 
these developments in the notions of the lawyer’s role.  The conflicts among ethical rules can be 
best resolved by weighing the interests of the relevant regulatory authorities in the context of the 
particular procedural and evidentiary rules of an international proceeding.
165MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 8.5 (b)(1).
166Menkel-Meadows, supra note 1, at  957.
167Menkel-Meadows, supra note 1, at 957 nn.42–43; Cf. Vagts, supra note 2, at 259 (calling for “uniform standards” in this area).
168CCBE CODE Rule 4.2.  Terry Part I, supra note 52, at 53.
169Menkel-Meadows, supra note 1, at  957.
Submission:  July 20, 2006 Page 42 of 42
Kirsten Weisenberger
Conclusion
Catherine Rogers’ article “Fit and Function” provides a novel approach to the analysis of 
conflicting rules of professional conduct in the context of international arbitration.  Her analysis  
of the interconnectedness of procedural rules, ethics and the lawyer’s role falls short, however, of 
compelling her recommendation that a code of ethics be developed especially for international 
arbitration.  I have argued that differing ethical rules across jurisdictions do not necessarily 
indicate fundamentally different roles of the lawyers in those jurisdictions.  Ethical rules are 
partly a function of the development of the legal profession over time.  Further, lawyers 
practicing in international arbitration do not take on a profoundly different role in that context.  
They bring their culturally specific professional outlook with them and the conflicts among 
ethical standards that arise in this setting are a necessary part of the continued development and 
professionalization of international arbitration.  A conflicts of laws approach to ethical dilemmas 
in international arbitration incorporates these complexities and accounts for the coequal 
sovereignty of the regulating states and the independence of the legal profession.  Application of 
conflicts of laws principles to resolve the ethical dilemmas that arise in the context of 
international arbitration will ensure that the standards for professional conduct in this venue 
support its reputation as a neutral and efficient method of adjudication that furthers both party 
and state interests. 
